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David McPherson. Virtue and Meaning: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2020. 222 pages. $99.99 (hardcover). 
“I want to be there when everyone suddenly finds out what it was all for.”  
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brother Karamazov 
 
What is the meaning of it all? This question strikes 
us in quiet moments—perhaps when we are 
standing near the crashing of waves, among pine-
scented winds, or before a setting sun. For most 
of us, the thought vanishes all too quickly, and we 
return to our busy work-a-world lives. Yet, when 
tragedy strikes—when faced with searing pain or 
chilling loss—we may also wonder in a different 
way: “What is the meaning of it all?” As David 
McPherson asks it: “Is life worth living in the face 
of evil and suffering?” In both questions, we face 
a “cosmodicy”, that is, the need to answer the 
ultimate questions of purpose and meaning. 
Perhaps what is essential to answering these 
questions is an ancient concept: virtue. 
Unearthed like an archeological find, virtue ethics 
is comparatively new in contemporary moral 
philosophy, and provides an attractive alternative. 
For much of the 20th century, deontology (which 
focuses on duty) and consequentialism (which 
focuses on the end results of actions) dominated 
academic ethics in the English-speaking world. 
Contemporary virtue ethics retrieves the grammar 
and concerns of the ancient Greek philosophers 
to focus on the state of one’s character or one’s 
habitual nature—in short, one’s state of being. For 
virtue ethicists, it is the fulfillment of one’s nature, 
as citizen of a particular community and as a 
member of the human species, that is the highest 
end: the achievement of “happiness,” or what 
Aristotle called flourishing or eudaimonia. 
Contemporary virtue ethics has emerged as a 
powerful and promising alternative in secular 
academic ethics. McPherson’s new book, Virtue 
and Meaning, advances this debate by bringing into 
focus a shortcoming in contemporary virtue 
ethics: because human beings are “meaning 
seeking animals” (1), virtue ethics needs more 
than the flattened, secular outlook of modernity 
that reduces human flourishing to a mere “natural 
function.”1  
In other words, the flourishing human life, as 
envisioned by most of today’s neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethicists, is more “neo” than “Aristotelian.” 
The good life of practicing the virtues, as 
proposed by the new virtue ethicists, is little 
different than from what’s implicit in modern 
deontology and utilitarianism. McPherson, a 
philosopher from Creighton University, draws 
from Charles Taylor, who has described our 
secular age as involving a disenchanted view of 
reality where faith and questions of deep meaning 
are mostly disregarded, or treated in merely 
personal, subjective terms, as “one human 
possibility among others.”2 McPherson argues that 
a disenchanted view of human nature does not 
square with our search for deep meaning. What is 
needed, according to McPherson, is a “re-
enchanted” view of the world, of meaning, and of 
human flourishing.  
A re-enchanted view of reality allows us to 
uncover a realm of “strong evaluative meaning” 
and reclaim fundamental human values, like the 
noble, dignified, and reverence worthy (32, 39). 
After situating his project in the contemporary 
debate, his task is to open up a space for a 
consideration of wonder, awe, and a sense of the 
grandeur of existence by extending the vocabulary 
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of the virtues to include “piety, humility, 
existential gratitude, and loving devotion” (42). 
McPherson argues that without the virtues we are 
blind and unresponsive to the deeper meaning in 
life. Having courage, self-control, and wisdom 
allows us to achieve human flourishing, true 
happiness—“a higher nobler, more meaningful 
mode of life” (53). We can see our lives as 
“wholes” connected to a “narrative quest” rather 
than as dismembered, functional, productive parts 
(53). This does not mean that the pursuit of strong 
evaluative meaning aided by the virtues will ensure 
ease and pleasure. Things may fall apart. 
Nonetheless, in the face of great evil McPherson 
thinks that—aided by the virtues—we should still 
seek “righteousness, come what may” (68). This was 
true of the Letter-Writers who faced Nazi 
persecution with dignity, courage, and even joy. In 
seeking these deeper purposes, we will find a 
richer good than fleeting happiness. Moreover, 
McPherson thinks that in the long run there is a 
“buoyance of the good”—a phrase borrowed 
from John Cottingham (74), McPherson’s strong 
evaluative meaning transforms the contemporary 
conception of happiness and meaning. Further, it 
reveals a shortcoming in modern virtue ethicists’ 
understanding of human flourishing. Yet, Virtue 
and Meaning goes one step further.  
We are “homo religiosus,” McPherson argues: We are 
made for spiritualty. Beyond our work, our 
entertainment, even our moral striving is a deeper 
longing that can only be fulfilled in contemplation. 
As Josef Pieper puts it,  
All practical activity, from practice of the 
ethical virtues to gaining the means of 
livelihood, serves something other than itself. 
And this other thing is not practical activity. It 
is having what is sought after, while we rest 
content in the results of our active efforts. 
Precisely that is the meaning of the old adage 
that the vita activa is fulfilled in the vita 
contemplative.3 
This contemplative activity is spiritual. In part, it is 
the pursuit of wonder with a philosophical attitude 
that becomes a “way of life” (169). Even more, 
contemplation allows us to see the world with new 
eyes: to partake in a “loving or affirmative 
beholding” (177). As McPherson says, “all of our 
work and striving is fulfilled in attentive 
appreciation of our work as well as the world 
around us” (177). In this, we can come to “feel at 
home” in the world—at least, in part. McPherson 
thinks that a wide variety of cosmic outlooks point 
to our quest for meaning. Nonetheless, 
McPherson affirms that we are made for a 
personal relationship with a loving God beyond 
this life. We are to give thanks “to” someone for 
the goodness of existence. In sum, McPherson 
presses home the need for re-enchantment. In 
doing so, McPherson’s Virtue and Meaning is an 
important book that points toward a new era of 
virtue ethics.   
After reading McPherson’s book, two weighty 
questions arise for me. First, does McPherson’s 
criticism do justice to Alasdair MacIntyre—a 
philosopher central to the revival of virtue ethics? 
McPherson places MacIntyre among the quasi-
scientific virtue ethicists. He charges MacIntyre 
with holding that human flourishing is 
“instrumental”, making our love for others merely 
part of “good functioning” (83). Against this, 
McPherson argues that only a re-enchanted 
conception of strong evaluative meaning allows us 
to see the true “dignity” and “sanctity” of others, 
especially the marginalized and those facing great 
disability. However, I find myself wondering 
whether McPherson presents an overly 
disenchanted MacIntyre. For example, MacIntyre 
writes, “the deepest desire of every [human] being, 
whether they acknowledge it or not, is to be at one 
with God” (quoted in McPherson, 187). 
As such, MacIntyre’s view seems open to the sort 
of re-enchantment proposed by McPherson. If so, 
then MacIntyre should be included with virtue 
ethicists (like McPherson) blazing this new trail. 
Second, what is the cure? That is, in light of 
McPherson’s arguments, how shall we live? 
McPherson’s book provides a diagnosis, but in 
terms of providing the antidote to excessive 
disenchantment, that path forward seems mostly 
suggestive. Perhaps part of the antidote is right in 
front of us—in our local communities. As Robert 
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Putnam noted: Americans increasingly are 
“bowling alone.”4 In our hyper-individualism, we 
have lost the unity that binds us together. The loss 
of participation in local social communities, 
intensified in times of quarantines, lockdowns, 
and hyper-isolation is pervasive in contemporary 
life. Staring at screens, we long for deep, 
meaningful relationships. Glass barriers—however 
necessary—are no substitute for face-to-face. That 
is to say, sharing in the life of a local community 
may join us with one of life’s deepest human 
values: the common good.  
In addition, for those of us involved in Jesuit 
higher education, we might note that the recently 
released Universal Apostolic Preferences list first 
“showing the way to God.” As an antidote to 
disenchantment, this includes particular practices 
of discernment that allow us to get in touch with 
one’s deepest self, the space where God speaks to 
us. McPherson’s argument lays bare a central 
shortcoming in modern virtue ethics with sharp, 
tight arguments, and he suggests a way forward 
with quotes that sparkle like gems. However, 
Virtue and Meaning is an academic work that 
confronts theory with theory. Nonetheless, it 
deserves praise for breaking hard theoretical 
ground. In its path, we are invited to pursue a 
deepened understanding of human flourishing 
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